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Sigala R, Logothetis NK, Rainer G. Own-species bias in the
representations of monkey and human face categories in the primate
temporal lobe. J Neurophysiol 105: 2740–2752, 2011. First published
March 23, 2011; doi:10.1152/jn.00882.2010.—Face categorization is
fundamental for social interactions of primates and is crucial for
determining conspeciﬁc groups and mate choice. Current evidence
suggests that faces are processed by a set of well-deﬁned brain areas.
What is the ﬁne structure of this representation, and how is it affected
by visual experience? Here, we investigated the neural representations
of human and monkey face categories using realistic three-dimen-
sional morphed faces that spanned the continuum between the two
species. We found an “own-species” bias in the categorical represen-
tation of human and monkey faces in the monkey inferior temporal
cortex at the level of single neurons as well as in the population
response analyzed using a pattern classiﬁer. For monkey and human
subjects, we also found consistent psychophysical evidence indicative
of an own-species bias in face perception. For both behavioural and
neural data, the species boundary was shifted away from the center of
the morph continuum, for each species toward their own face cate-
gory. This shift may reﬂect visual expertise for members of one’s own
species and be a signature of greater brain resources assigned to the
processing of privileged categories. Such boundary shifts may thus
serve as sensitive and robust indicators of encoding strength for
categories of interest.
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THE ABILITY to rapidly sort stimuli into categories is central to
cognition in primates, and its neural basis continues to be a
major focus of experimental studies in cognitive neuroscience.
In monkeys, neural activity has been shown to correlate with
categorical judgements (Akrami et al. 2009; Baker et al. 2002;
Freedman and Assad 2006; Freedman et al. 2003; Sigala and
Logothetis 2002). This work clearly shows that behavioral
training strongly inﬂuences neural responses to stimulus cate-
gories, emphasizing that learned contingencies in particular
tasks are reﬂected in higher-level visual cortexes. A separate
line of investigation has focused on the representation of
natural categories in the inferior temporal (IT) cortex (Kiani et
al. 2007; Kriegeskorte et al. 2008; Quiroga et al. 2005; Vogels
1999) by investigating visual responses to large sets of stimuli
from natural categories. These studies focused on studying the
structure of the representation of stimulus categories that ob-
servers have acquired during their everyday experience with
these stimuli. It has been shown that neural response patterns
tend to form clusters that correspond to natural categories
(Kiani et al. 2007). The representation of natural categories has
also been extensively investigated using functional neuroim-
aging. These studies have focused on delineating regions of
cortex that are metabolically active during the processing of
particular stimulus categories (Grill-Spector et al. 2004; Haxby
et al. 2001; Tsao et al. 2006). Of particular interest is a recent
study (Kriegeskorte et al. 2008) that compared the representa-
tion of natural object categories in the IT cortex of humans and
macaque monkeys. The category representations indeed share
many characteristics in the two species, suggesting that a
common code may exist in the primate temporal lobe for
natural categories. This notion is also supported by another
recent functional neuroimaging study (Tsao et al. 2008) that
suggested an anatomic correspondence between face-selective
areas deﬁned in human and monkey brains. The existence of
such a common code suggests that categorization of natural
stimulus categories might not be as ﬂexible as the work using
behavioral paradigms suggests but conforms with a rather ﬁxed
structure that is conserved across primate species. Neverthe-
less, speciﬁc visual experiences of humans and monkeys might
cause systematic variations in the natural category representa-
tion in each species. To address how experience shapes cate-
gorical representations, we focused on the representation of
own- and other-species faces, natural categories for which we
expected that differences in perception and neural representa-
tion might exist between monkey and human observers. We
used realistic three-dimensional (3-D) morphed faces that
spanned the continuum between humans and monkeys. Re-
sponses to such morphed stimuli are critical for establishing
boundaries between categorical representations (Harnad 1987).
We examined the modulation of single neuron activity across
the species continuum, ﬁrst by verifying its existence and then
determining the location of the species boundary from the
neural population activity using a pattern classiﬁer. We also
used the activity of “face cells” to provide additional veriﬁca-
tion of the existence and location of the species boundary, and
we present psychophysical evidence from monkey and human
observers regarding the location of the species boundary.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Stimuli. To create the human/monkey morphs, we ﬁrst scanned
faces of humans and monkeys using a commercial system (3DMD) to
acquire 3-D information about their form and texture. We then applied
a method based on Support Vector Machines (SVM) (Steinke et al.
2005) that linearly interpolates between two 3-D objects. This method
can be generally divided in two algorithms. By solving an optimiza-
tion problem, the ﬁrst algorithm ﬁnds a representation of any 3-D
object in terms of a hyperplane in Hilbert space H, given a cloud of
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surface points on the face as training data. These points are obtained
by scanning the real faces. After the ﬁrst algorithm has created such
a representation of the 3-D faces (implicitly represented by kernel
machines), the second algorithm computes a dense correspondence
between two surfaces (in our case, the faces) by matching them using
additional feature points (“markers”). Once faces shared the same
representation and were in total correspondence, we interpolated them
and rendered the images using commercial software (3D Studio Max).
Object stimuli were constructed from 3-D models of fruits, furniture,
toys, and a human hand. All stimuli were shown in grayscale, were
presented in trial-randomized views (20 to20°) and sizes (8–12°),
and were normalized in terms of contrast and mean luminance,
minimizing the inﬂuence of low-level cues. Some examples of the
images used in our experiments are shown in the Supplemental
Material (Supplemental Fig. S1).1
Monkey ﬁxation task and recording methods. Two adult male
monkeys (Macaca mulatta; monkeys M1 and M2) participated in the
experiments. All experiments were approved by the local authorities
(Regierungspraesidium, Tuebingen, Germany) and followed the guide-
lines of the European Community (European Union directive 86/609/
EEC) for the care and use of laboratory animals. Stimuli were shown on
a 21-in. gamma-corrected monitor located 97 cm from the monkeys.
After ﬁxation to a spot of light presented at the center of gaze for 400
ms, a single stimulus (object or face) was presented for 500 ms in
pseudorandom order. Monkeys were ﬁxating to the single stimulus
throughout each trial in a window of 1° radius. Scleral search coil
sampling at 200 Hz (CNC Engineering, Enﬁeld, CT) was used to
monitor eye movements. Monkeys were rewarded with juice if they
ﬁxated through the whole trial. Recordings were done using platinum/
tungsten electrodes coated with quartz glass with an impedance
between 1 and 2 M (ESI2ec, Thomas Recording, Giessen, Ger-
many). Electrodes were controlled with a ﬁve-channel electrode drive
(Thomas Recording). We used a chamber consisting of a ball-and-
socket joint with an 18-gauge stainless steel tube passing through its
center. Chambers were implanted using the following Horsley-Clark
coordinates: 6 mm anterior-posterior (AP) and 25 mm mediolateral
(ML) in monkey M1 and 6 mm AP and 23.4 mm ML in monkey M2.
Data analysis. We recorded neural signals bandpass ﬁltered be-
tween 100 Hz and 4 kHz. Single units were extracted using a
commercial ofﬂine spike-sorting system (Ofﬂine Sorter, Plexon, Dal-
las, TX). Neural responses were estimated by averaging activity from
100 to 300 ms after the stimulus onset. This time window is consistent
with a previous study (Sugase et al. 1999) showing that a large amount
of information about face features is encoded between 100 and 200 ms
after stimulus presentation. Neurons with signiﬁcantly greater re-
sponses to any of the presented stimuli compared with baseline
(0–200 ms before stimulus presentation) were considered as “visually
responsive.” To characterize the tuning properties of single neurons,
we used regressors as templates, as represented by the following
functions: [1 1 1 0 0 0] for “step like,” [0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1] for
“monotonic like,” and [0 0.5 1 1 0.5 0] for “inverted U shaped.” For
each neuron, we constructed a vector by concatenating the mean
responses to each morph trajectory (the vector length was 24 given the
4 trajectories and 6 levels/trajectory). To calculate the correlations, we
concatenated four times each regressor’s function to obtain vectors of
the same length. Only neurons with signiﬁcant correlation coefﬁcients
were labeled as one of the three classes (P value of the Pearson’s
correlation  0.05/3, Bonferroni corrected). If a neuron signiﬁcantly
correlated with more than one function, its label was then assigned on
the basis of the maximum absolute value of the correlation.
Neural population classiﬁer. Population activity was represented as
a matrix with 238 rows (34 unique stimuli  7 repetitions) and as
many columns as recorded neurons in each monkey. We reduced the
dimensionality of the data using principal component analysis and
retained 10% of the components accounting for the greatest variance
in the raw data (monkey M1: 19 principal components, 36% of overall
variance; monkey M2: 21 principle components, 36% of overall
variance) for submission to a two-class linear SVM classiﬁer. We
used SPIDER, a Matlab toolbox that implements a SVM classiﬁer
(http://www.kyb.tuebingen.mpg.de/bs/people/spider/). For simplicity,
we used a linear kernel function to estimate the dividing hyperplane,
which separates the data points into two groups. However, we also
tested a Gaussian (nonlinear) kernel, which showed no signiﬁcant
difference in the results. In all our simulations, the parameter C, which
controls for the generalization error, was ﬁxed to C  1. This value
was selected (using cross-validation) after assessing the performance
in a subset of our data. The classiﬁer was ﬁrst used to label the neural
activity elicited by ambiguous faces (morphs) as “human” or “mon-
key” given the pattern of activation evoked by prototypical human and
monkey faces (referred to here as the “classiﬁcation task”). To this
effect, we trained the classiﬁer to distinguish between the activation
elicited by human and monkey faces. Training examples were 75% of
the trials (randomly selected) in which prototypical faces were shown
(32 of 42 trials for each category, humans and monkeys). We tested
the classiﬁer’s performance on the remaining 25% of the trials
corresponding to prototypical faces (10 of 42 trials/category) and all
trials of the remaining morphed faces (112 trials resulting from 7
presentations of 4 faces of each morph level: 20%, 40%, 60%, and
80%). To calculate the position of the boundary, we ﬁtted psycho-
metric functions to the classiﬁer’s decisions using the psigniﬁt toolbox
(version 2.5.6) for Matlab (Wichmann and Hill 2001). To compute
conﬁdence intervals, we calculated the boundary using only 75% of
the recorded cells (randomly selected) and repeated this procedure
100 times. Signiﬁcance was tested with a nonparametric test (Wil-
coxon signed-rank test) comparing the distribution of categorical
boundaries against a “null hypothesis” distribution. This distribution
was computed by “shufﬂing” the category (or labels) of the trials
during training, repeating the ﬁtting procedure, and iterating again 100
times (shufﬂing the labels of the training examples before iterating is
a standard procedure used to compute the “baseline” performance of
a classiﬁer; we will refer to it here as “shufﬂed bootstraps”). The mean
boundary in shufﬂed bootstraps was place at the center of the contin-
uum2%. We also used the classiﬁer to analyze the sensitivity of the
neural population to detect differences between morph faces differing
by 20% in the species continuum (referred to here as the “discrimi-
nation task”). For this, we trained the classiﬁer with 75% of the trials
(randomly selected) of each of the two morph levels contrasted (0%
vs. 20%, 20% vs. 40%, 40% vs. 60%, etc., resulting in 21 of 28 trials
for each morph level). Afterward, the classiﬁer was tested with the
remaining trials (7 of 28 trials for each morph level). Performance of
the discrimination task (d=) was computed as follows: d=  z(H) 
z(F), where H is the number of “hits” or correct classiﬁer decision and
F is the number of “false alarms” or wrong classiﬁer decisions. Both
values were z-transformed to obtain d=. As in the classiﬁcation task,
conﬁdence intervals were obtained using bootstrapping, and signiﬁ-
cance was tested by comparing performance against performance on
shufﬂed bootstraps.
Transmission of category information by face cells. To select face
cells, we considered a criterion based on the very ﬁrst studies that
systematically investigated neural responses to faces and other com-
plex objects (Perrett 1994; Perrett et al. 1982; Perrett 1979). Accord-
ingly, we considered as face cells neurons whose mean response to
faces was greater than twice the mean response to objects (20 neurons
in monkey M1 and 9 neurons in monkey M2). From this population,
only a few neurons signiﬁcantly correlated with the three regressors
deﬁned above (step like: 3 of 20 neurons in monkey M1 and 0 of 9
neurons in monkey M2, monotonic like: 5 of 20 neurons in monkey M1
and 1 of 9 neurons in monkey M2, and inverted U shaped: 4 of 20
neurons in monkey M1 and 1 of 9 neurons in monkey M2). For each
face cell, we computed the mutual information between responses to
pairs of face stimuli adjacent in the morph continuum (0% vs. 20%,
1 Supplemental Material for this article is available at the Journal of
Neurophysiology website.
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20% vs. 40%, 40% vs. 60%, etc.). The mutual information I(S,R)
quantiﬁes how well different neural responses (R) discriminate be-
tween different stimuli (S). Here, we were interested in how the
responses of a neuron discriminated between two adjacent morph
levels. I(S,R) was estimated in the following form:
I(S |R)
r,s
P(s)P(r | s)log2
P(r | s)
Pr
where P is the probability. Intuitively, I(S,R) quantiﬁes the reduction
of uncertainty (entropy) about the stimulus gained after observing the
response to this stimulus. For each trial, we counted the number of
spikes within 100 and 300 ms after stimulus presentation to estimate
the response r to each stimulus s. The number of spikes counted on
each trial varied between 5 and 30 spikes depending on the neuron. To
precisely quantify information transmission given our experimental
constrains (e.g., number of trials), it was necessary to reduce the
number of possible neural responses. We therefore divided ﬁring rates
in ﬁve classes ensuring an adequate sampling of these values (r R {1,
2, 3, 4, 5}) (Panzeri et al. 2007). The stimuli were separated into two
classes since we were interested in obtaining information about two
adjacent morph levels (s  S  {1, 2}). Therefore, responses to faces
of the same morph level were pooled into one single category (0%,
20%, 40%, etc.). Each condition contained the exact same number of
trials, and, therefore, information bit rates could be used to compare
the conditions, although they were not corrected for low sample
numbers. We considered the category boundary to be the point
along the continuum with maximal sensitivity or, in this case, with
the highest information transmission. To precisely estimate this
point, we ﬁtted Gaussian curves to the mean mutual information
values, since those values showed a clear inverted U shape. To
calculate conﬁdence intervals, we used bootstrapping statistics. On
each iteration (repeated 100 times), we randomly sampled 70% of the
face-selective neurons, recalculated mean values, ﬁtted a Gaussian
curve, and estimated the categorical boundary given by the peak of the
Gaussian curve. We computed a null hypothesis distribution of bound-
aries by recalculating information values using shufﬂed labels, repeat-
ing the subsampling procedure, and ﬁtting Gaussian curves (100
iterations). The mean boundary in the case of the shufﬂed bootstraps
was at 50% (1.5 SE) and signiﬁcantly different compared with the
mean boundary calculated directly from the data (P  104 in both
monkeys by a Wilcoxon signed-rank test).
Monkey preferential looking experiment. After the recordings con-
cluded, the same two monkeys participated in this experiment. Each
trial was initiated after the monkey ﬁxated within a square region of
10  10° located at the center of the screen, which was indicated by
a ﬁxation cross. Within this region, a face (of 	10  10° in size) was
presented as long as the monkeys looked at it, but for no longer than
5 s. If the monkey ﬁxated out of the region containing the face, or after
5 s of face inspection, the face was replaced by a ﬁxation cross. When
the monkey gazed again at the ﬁxation cross within the 10  10°
square region, a blank stimulus (a gray square of size 10  10°) was
presented. As for the face, the blank stimulus was presented as long as
the monkeys looked at it or at most during 5 s. The faces and blanks
were alternated in this way until both together were viewed for a total
of 20 s. Face stimuli were videos made by moving a virtual camera
around full-color mode 3-D faces (from 20 to 20° along the faces’
vertical axis). One of three types of faces was randomly presented on
each trial: 100% monkey, 50% monkey, or 0% monkey, all taken from
only one morph trajectory. At the end of every trial, during the period
of 5 s before the next trial started, the monkey was provided with
juice.
Human tasks. For the “same/different task,” 10 subjects attended to
a face shown for 500 ms followed by a 1-s blank period and also by
a second face presented for 500 ms. As in the electrophysiology
experiments with monkeys, faces were presented at random viewing
angles (20 to 20°) and sizes (8–12°). On “same” trials, two
different views of the same face were presented at each morph level
from 10% to 90%. On “different” trials, two faces from the same
morph trajectory but differing by 20% in their morph level (10%
and 10% from the morph center) were presented. Subjects had to
indicate whether the face was the same or different and received
feedback about their performance after each trial. In a second exper-
iment, the same subjects had to explicitly categorize face images with
morph levels ranging from 0% to 100% with increments of 10%. The
same images were presented during 500 ms followed by a blank
period of 1 s in which subjects had to press a button to indicate the
category of the image (human or monkey). Trials ended with a blank
period of 1 s. In both experiments, subjects were instructed to ﬁxate
at a cross, which was placed at the center of the screen during the
whole trial. Additionally, we instructed them to avoid concentrating
their attention on a particular feature or subspace of the images but
rather to respond “intuitively” (without thinking about it) based on
their general impression. Subjects could give two different responses
by pressing one of the two buttons reachable with the left and right
hands, respectively. At the beginning of the experiment, subjects were
instructed to press one of the buttons to choose one of the two options
(same or different in experiment 1 and human or monkey in experi-
ment 2). To select one of the two types of responses, half of the
subjects used the left hand, whereas the other half used the right hand.
This was done to avoid any artifacts caused by pairing one hand to a
particular response.
RESULTS
We used realistic 3-D morphed face stimuli that spanned the
continuum between human and monkey faces, as shown in Fig. 1A.
In contrast to the majority of previously published work using
face stimuli, we presented faces to observers rendered from
3-D face models at random orientations (20°) on each trial,
discouraging observers from attending to speciﬁc spatial fea-
tures. Examples of those face images are shown in Fig. 1B. To
generate linear morphs, we used a state of the art method based
on machine learning (Steinke et al. 2005). This method estab-
lishes a correspondence between surface points on each of the
faces in 3-D using a SVM algorithm. Once this correspondence
is known, one face can be transformed into another by linearly
moving all corresponding points. This ensures that faces are
morphed on a strictly linear trajectory. To verify that the
morphs were actually linear in terms of physical characteris-
tics, we performed detailed simulations using image statistics
and a Gabor ﬁlter bank model (see Supplemental Material). We
show that face pairs differing by a constant amount in the
morph space were equally similar in terms of physical attri-
butes, regardless of the position along the morph continuum.
This conﬁrms that in terms of physical characteristics, the
monkey-human face morphs were indeed linear. We used these
morphed face stimuli to study activity from single neurons in
the monkey IT cortex and to gather psychophysical evidence
about the face species boundary in both monkey and human
observers. Morphed faces resulted from the linear interpolation
of two monkey and two human faces, leading to four morph
lines (see Fig. 1A). Since we focused on species effects here,
stimuli were grouped according to their morph level, irrespec-
tive of the morph line. For the neural recordings, we included
six objects (fruits, furniture, etc.) in our stimulus set to identify
face-selective cells, which are neurons that discriminate be-
tween faces and objects (Supplemental Fig. S1 shows more
examples of the images used).
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Single neuron activity changes systematically along the
monkey-human continuum. We recorded the activity of 408
single units (194 single units in monkey M1 and 214 single
units in monkey M2) in area TE of the IT cortex during a
ﬁxation task. As shown in Fig. 2, A and B, recordings were
performed below the superior temporal sulcus and distributed
along 6 mm of the AP axis (relative to the interaural line).
Mean responses across all recorded cells showed no consistent
differences in both monkeys between the responses to monkey
and human faces (mean ﬁring rates: monkey M1, 7.88 and 7.69
spikes/s for human and monkey faces, respectively, P
 0.1 by
paired t-test; monkey M2, 6.93 and 7.13 spikes/s, P  0.05 by
paired t-test). We found, however, that the activity of many
neurons was systematically modulated by the morph level. We
distinguished three major classes of neurons, examples of
which are shown in Fig. 1, C–E, and Supplemental Fig. S3.
Step-like neurons, which show a sharp change in activity at an
intermediate morph level, have been previously associated
with categorical perception, because they tend to show more
similar activity to stimuli within categories than between cat-
egories (Freedman et al. 2001 and 2003; Akrami et al. 2009).
Monotonic-like neurons may reﬂect changes in the physical
properties of the face stimuli, with a general preference for
either human or monkey faces. The class of inverted U-shaped
tuned neurons is of particular interest, because such neurons
tend to be more active at intermediate morph levels near the
category boundary. From all cells signiﬁcantly correlated to
any of the three functions (49 of 194 neurons or 25% in monkey
M1 and 30 of 214 neurons or 14% in monkey M2), step-like
neurons were encountered less frequently (7 of 49 neurons or
14% in monkey M1 and 7 of 30 neurons or 23% in monkey
M2). More common in the population were neurons showing
monotonic-like (25 of 49 neurons or 51% in monkey M1 and 10
of 30 neurons or 33% in monkey M2) or inverted U-shaped (17 of
49 neurons or 35% in monkey M1 and 13 of 30 neurons or 43%
in monkey M2) morph level tuning. A few neurons signiﬁcantly
correlated with both monotonic-like and step-like functions (11 of
194 neurons or 6% in monkey M1 and 3% in monkey M2). In such
Fig. 1. Human/monkey face space and re-
sponses of exemplar single units. A: the face
space was composed by four morph trajec-
tories (M1–M4) that resulted after morphing
two human into two monkey faces (shown at
the corners of the space) in ﬁve steps (20%
change). The horizontal axis of the space
reﬂects differences in identity, whereas the
vertical axis represents changes in the “spe-
cies level.” Morphs are arranged in descend-
ing order going from humans (0%) to mon-
keys (100%). B: from the three-dimensional
face space, we rendered images of faces with
different identities (taken from different
morph trajectories), orientations, and sizes.
All images were grayscale with normalized
contrast and luminance values. C–E: neu-
ral responses of three exemplar units with
“step-like” (C), “inverted U-shaped” (D),
and “monotonic-like” (E) tuning curves.
The gray layer superimposed on each stim-
ulus illustrates the strength of the response.
Face stimuli are arranged as in A; objects
are placed on the right. As shown by the
raster plot on the right part of C, the gray
color code accounts for the average num-
ber of spikes recorded 100–300 ms after
stimulus presentation. For each neuron, the
range of the response (in spikes/s) is indi-
cated by the color bar on the bottom right.
Curves on the left are the mean ﬁring rates
(FRs) across all faces of the same morph
level. The neuron in C was responsive to
faces and objects, whereas neurons in D
and E were only responsive to faces.
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cases, the labels of the cells were assigned according to the
greatest correlation value. The remaining neurons (145 of 194
neurons or 75% in monkey M1 and 184 of 214 neurons or 86% in
monkey M2) were unresponsive (26 of 194 neurons or 13% in
monkey M1 and 71 of 214 neurons or 33% in monkey M2) or did
not signiﬁcantly correlated with the deﬁned tuning functions (119
of 194 neurons or 61% in monkey M1 and 113 of 214 neurons or
53% in monkey M2).
Decoding the monkey-human category boundary from the
neural population reveals a shift toward own species. We
applied a machine learning algorithm to determine the location
of the category boundary in the species continuum between
human and monkey faces considering all recorded cells. The
logic of this approach was to train a classiﬁcation algorithm to
distinguish between the pattern of neural activity elicited by
human and monkey faces and then let it classify the neural
responses to the morphed faces along the monkey-human
continuum as belonging to one of the two categories (human or
monkey). We trained the classiﬁer with a random subset (75%)
of trials in which the responses to human (0% morph level) and
monkey (100% morph level) faces were learned by the classi-
ﬁer. The classiﬁer was then tested with the remaining (25%)
trials containing the neural responses to faces at 0% and 100%
morph level as well as all the trials with the responses to faces
Fig. 2. Recording sites and population analysis using the pattern classiﬁer. A and B: recording sites in monkeys M1 and M2. The x- and y-axes indicate the distance (in
mm) to the interaural line in the anterior-posterior (AP) axis and to the superior temporal sulcus (STS), respectively. Recording locations are marked by solid circles.
Sites in which visually responsive and face-selective cells were encountered are marked by solid squares and red circles, respectively. C and D: estimation of the category
boundary using whole neural population activity and the pattern classiﬁer. C: the horizontal axis represents the continuum from human (0%) to monkey (100%) illustrated
with faces of the M1 morph trajectory for clariﬁcation (see Fig. 1A). The vertical axis indicates the proportion of test trials labeled by the classiﬁer as “monkey.” Training
data were exclusively chosen from a subset (3/4 of the trials) of responses to human (0%) and monkey (100%) faces (enclosed in blue and red boxes along the x-axis,
respectively). In the test phase, the classiﬁer labeled the remaining responses (1/4 of the trials) to human and monkey faces as well as all trials with responses to the
morphed faces (enclosed in a green box along the x-axis). To obtain conﬁdence intervals, we iterated 100 times randomly selecting 75% of the total number of neurons.
The colored circles, curves, and dashed lines represent the classiﬁer’s responses, psychometric functions, and category boundaries calculated on every single iteration,
respectively (only 20 iterations are shown for simplicity). The mean category boundary (62%, marked with the red arrow) was signiﬁcantly shifted away from the center
of the continuum toward the monkey side (P 0.05 by a Wilcoxon signed-rank test vs. “shufﬂed bootstraps”). D: classiﬁer performance in the discrimination of neural
responses to adjacent pairs of morphed faces. Performance (d=) is shown in the vertical axis as a function of the pair of responses compared and illustrated in the horizontal
axis by the ﬁve pairs of faces (0% vs. 20%, 20% vs. 40%, 40% vs. 60%, etc). Performance reached a peak in the 60% versus 80% comparison, which was signiﬁcantly
greater than shufﬂed bootstraps (P  0.05), the mean across the other pairs (P  0.05 by a Wilcoxon signed-rank test), and the mirror case on the other side of the
continuum (20% vs. 40%, P  0.01 by a Wilcoxon signed-rank test).
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at intermediate morph levels, ensuring a separation of test and
training data. The procedure was repeated 100 times using also
new randomly selected neurons (75% of the total population)
to obtain conﬁdence intervals. At each iteration, a psychomet-
ric function was ﬁtted to the classiﬁer decisions, and the
category boundary was estimated (Fig. 2C, colored curves and
vertical dashed lines). We applied this method to the entire
population of recorded IT neurons, thus precluding any selec-
tion biases. As shown in Fig. 2C, the classiﬁer determined the
boundary between the human and monkey species to be at a
morph level of 62% in the pooled data of the two monkeys, but
also consistently in each monkey separately (64% and 61% in
monkeys M1 and M2, respectively). The boundary was signif-
icantly shifted away from the center of the human to monkey
continuum at the 50% morph level, toward the side of the
monkey faces (Wilcoxon signed-rank test vs. shufﬂed boot-
straps, P  0.01 for both monkeys and P  0.05 on single
monkey data; see METHODS for details). This boundary shift
suggests the existence of a bias in the face representation
towards own-species faces in the monkey cortex.
To further study the boundary shift, we examined whether faces
within a category were indeed discriminated more poorly than
faces between categories separated from each other by an equal
physical amount. A peak in the discrimination performance is
indicative of a sharp transition within the morph continuum,
whereas the lack of such a peak suggests a smooth representation
of the morph continuum with no measurable transitions. We thus
submitted to the same classiﬁer described above neural responses
to adjacent pairs of morphed faces along the continuum (morph
levels: 0% vs. 20%, 20% vs. 40%, 40% vs. 60%, 60% vs. 80%,
and 80% vs. 100%). For each pair of morphed faces, the classiﬁer
estimated how different the corresponding neural activation pat-
terns were. For each comparison, the classiﬁer was trained with a
randomly selected subset (75% of trials) of the neural data of the
given two classes. Classiﬁer performance was estimated by ex-
amining the assignment of the remaining responses (25% of trials)
to the correct class. This procedure was repeated 100 times with
new randomly selected neurons (75% of the total) to obtain
conﬁdence intervals. Classiﬁer performance is related to the de-
gree of similarity between the neural activation patterns elicited by
the two classes: low performance indicates similar activation
patterns, whereas high performance indicates substantial differ-
ences in activation patterns. As shown in Fig. 2D, we found a peak
in classiﬁer performance for the 60% versus 80% morph level
classiﬁcation when the data of both monkeys (mean d=  0.85)
were pooled, but also consistently in both monkeys separately
(mean d= in monkey M1: 0.65 and monkey M2: 0.71). In this
comparison, performance was signiﬁcantly higher than shufﬂed
bootstraps (P  0.05 in both monkeys) and signiﬁcantly greater
than the mean performance across the other pairs (P  0.05 in
both monkeys by a Wilcoxon signed-rank test). This procedure
follows that used in other studies regarding categorical perception
of facial attributes. In addition, the classiﬁer performance was
greatly enhanced (P  0.01 for both monkeys together and P 
0.05 in single monkey data by a Wilcoxon signed-rank test)
compared with the mirror condition on the other side of the morph
space center (20% vs. 40% morph level). Taken together, the
boundary shift estimated using the population classiﬁer and the
corresponding peak in discrimination performance represent
strong evidence for an own-species bias in the categorical repre-
sentation of faces in the macaque IT cortex.
Shifted category boundary estimated from single face-selec-
tive neurons. While the above analysis used machine learning to
classify neural activity of the entire population of neurons, we
went on to demonstrate that face-selective single neurons also
provide strong support for an own-species bias in the categorical
representation of species. For this analysis, we selected “face
neurons,” which responded more to faces than to object stimuli, in
each monkey according to standard criteria (see METHODS). Note
that these neurons tended to be anatomically distributed through-
out the recording regions (see Fig. 2, A and B), although there was
some apparent clustering near AP 6 in both monkeys, a region that
has been termed the “middle face patch” using fMRI. We did not
encounter areas where only face neurons were located in our
recordings. In addition, face neurons were also found to be
distributed across the remaining recording sites. We did not
observe consistent effects of face species on mean responses
across these cells (mean ﬁring rate in monkey M1 of 9.96 and 8.94
spikes/s for human and monkey faces, respectively, P 
 0.1 by
paired t-test; mean ﬁring rate in monkey M2 of 7.27 and 7.85
spikes/s, P
 0.5 by paired t-test). For the face-selective neurons,
we used information theory (Panzeri et al. 2007) to verify the
existence and determine the location of the category boundary.
We computed how much information each neuron communicated
about pairs of faces separated by a constant physical distance
(20% morph level) at each point along the monkey to human
continuum. We averaged the mutual information values at each
morph pair across neurons. Since the resulting curves displayed
clear peaks around the center of the continuum (inverted U
shaped), we ﬁtted Gaussian functions to these data to precisely
estimate the location of the boundary, as indicated by the position
of maximal sensitivity. As the red curves shown in Fig. 3, A
and B, demonstrate, the peak of the average information was
signiﬁcantly shifted toward the monkey side (monkey M1:
68% morph level and monkey M2: 56% morph level, con-
ﬁdence intervals were obtained using bootstrapping, P 
104 in both monkeys by a Wilcoxon signed-rank test vs.
shufﬂe bootstraps; see METHODS for details). This provides
conﬁrmation of the own-species face representation bias and
demonstrates that this effect is present in face cells. Inter-
estingly, the population of face neurons was composed not
only of step-like neurons but also contained equal or greater
numbers belonging to the other classes of monotonic-like
and inverted U-shaped neurons. Additionally, we computed
the same mutual information analysis using the least face-
selective neurons [according to a standard face selectivity
index (Tsao et al. 2006) and considering the same number of
face-selective cells to avoid any bias]. We found that, in
both monkeys, the mean categorical boundary was placed at
the center and was not signiﬁcantly different from the null
hypothesis (shufﬂed bootstraps) distribution (P 
 0.1 in
both monkeys by a Wilcoxon signed-rank test). This sug-
gests that category information is not conﬁned to neurons
with a particular tuning curve along the monkey human
continuum but rather is distributed among the population
with a prominent inﬂuence in the face-selective cells.
Psychophysical evidence for an own-species bias in the
categorical perception of face species in human and monkey
observers. Together, these ﬁndings indicate an own-species
bias in monkey IT cortical face representation, as revealed by
a shifted category boundary toward the monkey side of the
species continuum. We further asked whether these neural
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effects also inﬂuenced the behavior of the monkey. We used a
preferential-looking paradigm (Dahl et al. 2007; Ghazanfar and
Logothetis 2003; Humphrey 1974), which relies on the obser-
vation that novel or out-of-context items tend to attract gaze
and are scrutinized longer. We thus presented stimuli corre-
sponding to human, monkey, and 50% morphed faces for 20-s
periods and determined the fraction of time that the monkeys
gazed at each of these stimulus types. Since monkeys spend
most of their time in conspeciﬁc groups, we expected that the
looking time would be greater for human than monkey faces
since human faces are more novel and out of context. We also
predicted that a 50% morph stimulus should be treated like a
human and not like a monkey face, given that the category
boundary falls at 60% of the human-monkey continuum. As
shown in Fig. 4, we found that for both monkeys the proportion
of time viewing 50% morphed faces (mean monkey M1: 0.603
and monkey M2: 0.569) was statistically identical (P 
 0.1 by
paired t-tests) to the viewing proportions for human faces
(mean monkey M1: 0.585 and monkey M2: 0.508) but statisti-
cally different (P  0.05 by paired t-tests) from monkey face
viewing proportions (mean monkey M1: 0.468 and monkey M2:
0.345). This pattern of results conﬁrmed our predictions and
Fig. 3. Discriminability of face-selective neurons along the morph continuum. A and B: discriminability in “face-selective” cells was evaluated in terms of the information
(bits in the vertical axis) transmitted about different pairs of stimuli (0% vs. 20%, 20% vs. 40%, 40% vs. 60%, etc., represented on the horizontal axis). As indicated
by the red curves ﬁtted to the mean information values (solid circles), the peak in the sensitivity was shifted from the center to the side of the monkey prototype (	68%
and 66% in monkeys M1 and M2, respectively, mean and conﬁdence intervals obtained using bootstrapping, P 104 in both monkeys by a Wilcoxon signed-rank test
vs. shufﬂed bootstraps; see METHODS for details). C–E: three examples of face cells (unit 191 in monkey M1 and units 173 and 4 in monkey M2) showing clear peaks
in their information transmission when responses to morphed faces at 60% and 80% of the continuum were compared. However, when their FRs along the continuum
were assessed (F–H), it was possible to observe different tuning curves rather than a predominant type of tuning. From these exemplar cells, two cells (F and G) were
categorized as inverted U shaped and monotonic like, respectively. The third cell (H) did not fall into any of the categories.
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provides independent behavioral evidence for a shift in the
category boundary away from the center of the morph space
and toward the monkey side.
In a ﬁnal step, we asked whether categorical effects could also
be seen in human observers using our morphed stimulus set. To
this end, we conducted a psychophysical experiment to measure
the performance of human subjects in distinguishing faces at
constant physical distance (20% morph level) along the species
continuum. As shown in Fig. 5A, the performance of the subjects
in terms of d= showed a clear peak as a function of morph level.
We ﬁtted a Gaussian function to the average performance and
estimated the location of the boundary to be at 33% morph level.
To demonstrate a categorical perception of the continuum (Beale
and Keil 1995; Calder 1996; Etcoff and Magee 1992; Levin and
Angelone 2002; Levin and Beale 2000), we compared the mean
sensitivity around the boundary (20% vs. 40% and 30% vs. 50)
against the mean sensitivity across all other pairs (P  0.01 by
t-test). By comparing the sensitivity close to the previously esti-
mated boundary (20% vs. 40% and 30% vs. 50%) and the sensi-
tivity in the mirror side of the continuum (50% vs. 70% and 60%
vs. 80%), we conﬁrmed the signiﬁcance of this bias toward
human faces (P  0.0001 by t-test). The category boundary shift
for human subjects was toward the human side and thus in the
opposite direction, but of similar magnitude, compared with that
seen in the monkey results described above. This experiment
provides an implicit measure of the human ability to distinguish
faces along the species continuum. We complemented this with an
explicit task where we asked human subjects to categorize brieﬂy
presented morphed faces as human or monkey. The results shown
in Fig. 5B demonstrate that this explicit task yielded identical
results compared with the implicit measure, with the category
boundary estimated to be at 41% morph level [signiﬁcantly
shifted from 50%, P 0.01 based on bootstrap simulations using
the psigniﬁt toolbox (version 2.5.6) for Matlab, which implements
the maximum likelihood method (Wichmann and Hill 2001)].
Linearity of morph space conﬁrmed by statistical properties
of the face morph images. The method used to create the
human/monkey morphs guarantees a linear interpolation of
Fig. 4. Results of the behavioral experiments
with monkey observers. A and B: preferen-
tial looking ratio obtained for monkeys M1
(A) and M2 (B) on each of the tree conditions
(faces with 100%, 50%, and 0% monkey
level). The vertical axis in each plot shows
the mean looking ratio, which was calculated
as the proportion of time within a trial in
which the monkeys looked at faces com-
pared with a blank image. Error bars repre-
sent SEs. In both monkeys separately, we
found a statistically signiﬁcant difference
only between the comparison of 100% ver-
sus 50% monkey (P  0.05 by paired t-test)
but not in the comparison of 50% versus 0%
monkey (P 
 0.1).
Fig. 5. Results of the psychophysical experiments with human observers. A: subjects’ sensitivity to detect differences along the species continuum. The d= value (vertical
axis) was plotted as a function of the position of the morph center in the species continuum (horizontal axis). To better estimate the position of the category boundary,
we ﬁtted a Gaussian curve and found the point in the species continuum where the curve reached its maximum. The category boundary was shifted from the center toward
the human side (mean boundary: 33%). B: results of the human or monkey face classiﬁcation experiment. The vertical axis shows the proportion of images perceived
as monkeys as a function of their position along the species continuum, shown as the horizontal axis. To ﬁnd the human/monkey perceptual boundary, we ﬁtted a
psychometric function and looked for the point at the human/monkey continuum that caused the responses to be at chance level (0.5). The category boundary in this
case was placed at 41%, signiﬁcantly shifted from the center toward the human side of the continuum (P  0.01 based on bootstrap simulations).
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two 3-D surfaces (Steinke et al. 2005). Nevertheless, we
decided to conﬁrm this linearity using additional control
analyses on the statistical properties of the images. Images
were analyzed in two ways: 1) a pixel-based comparison
computing the root mean squared error (RMSE) between
pairs of images and 2) using an image classiﬁcation model
inspired by standard models of the hierarchical processing
of information in the visual cortex (Riesenhuber and Poggio
1999; Serre et al. 2007).
The pixel-based analysis quantiﬁes differences between
pairs of images in terms of their global contrast and luminance
levels. Since the simplicity of this analysis allows us to test
many images, we compared all images that were also com-
pared by human observers in our experiments. Pairs of images
were compared pixelwise using the RMSE (see the Supple-
mental Material for details). Figure 6A shows the means and
SEs of the RMSEs for each condition. As the plot shows, there
was no systematic modulation along the continuum and, more
Fig. 6. Statistical properties of the images
verify the linearity of the morph trajectories.
A: the blue curve shows the average root
mean square error (RMSE; vertical axis) and
SEs for each comparison (horizontal axis).
As in the psychophysical experiments, pairs
of images compared were taken from the
same morph trajectory but with different
views and sizes. The two pictures below the
plot show the pixel values of two exemplar
images (100% and 80% monkey), repre-
sented as 400  400-pixel maps with values
ranging from 1 to 256. B: classiﬁcation
performance of an “unbiased” classiﬁer
based on standard models of object recog-
nition in the visual cortex (see the Supple-
mental Material for details). Performance is
shown as the proportion of images (vertical
axis) along the continuum (horizontal axis)
classiﬁed as monkeys. To compute conﬁ-
dence intervals, the classiﬁcation procedure
was repeated 50 times by randomly selecting
a subset of image features as well as train
and test image sets (see the Supplemental
Material for details). Colored circles and
curves show the performance on single itera-
tions in which the positions of the boundaries
(vertical dashed lines) were calculated. As ex-
pected from a linear continuum, the average
position of the boundary was not statistically
different from 50% (51  1.54%).
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importantly, the tests used to demonstrate categorical represen-
tation (performance around the boundaries found in human or
monkey observers higher than the mean across all other con-
ditions) were not statistically signiﬁcant (P 
 0.3 by t-tests).
This indicates that images from adjacent morph levels differ by
a similar amount in terms of basic image properties. From this
it follows that the morphs themselves do not contain any clear
boundaries or discontinuities, consistent with their generation
by linear interpolation.
The second analysis uses a biological inspired approach that
mimics the hierarchical processing in early stages of the visual
cortex to quantify differences between image sets. The archi-
tecture of the model is based on standard models of hierarchi-
cal processing in the visual cortex (Riesenhuber and Poggio
1999; Serre et al. 2007) and consists of three layers (see
Supplemental Fig. S2 and the Supplemental Material for de-
tails). The ﬁrst layer ﬁlters the images according to the re-
sponses of a bank of Gabor wavelets. The second layer selects
the most informative features using a simple mechanism based
on the variance of the ﬁlters’ outputs across all images. The
third layer classiﬁes images encoded by the previous layer
using a linear SVM. In this case, the model was used to
“discriminate” and “classify” the same images used in the
electrophysiological experiments. Accordingly, faces from dif-
ferent morph trajectories, with different sizes and views, were
considered together based only on their morph levels. Conﬁ-
dence intervals were calculated using bootstrapping statistics,
randomly selecting independent sets of train and test images
(see the Supplemental Material for details). In the discrimina-
tion task, the classiﬁer was trained to distinguish between
adjacent sets of images along the continuum (20% difference).
The results of these simulations showed that the mean sensi-
tivity along the continuum was not categorical, according to
the standard tests previously explained (P 
 0.1). In the
classiﬁcation task, the classiﬁer was trained to label morphed
images along the continuum as human or monkey. Figure 6B
shows results of the 50 iterations (represented by the different
colored dots and curves) in which the model classiﬁed images
along the continuum. The mean position of the categorical
boundary was not signiﬁcantly different from 50% (grand
mean 51%  1.54 SE). These results, together with the result
of the RMSE analysis, conﬁrmed that the morph continuum is
indeed linear and that the mean boundary computed using an
“unbiased” classiﬁer is centered at 50% of the continuum.
DISCUSSION
We observed an own-species bias in the categorical repre-
sentation of faces in monkey and human observers. The cate-
gory boundary was, for each group of observers, shifted toward
their own species. This indicates that the two species perceive
the exact same face morph continuum in a fundamentally
different way. Recent evidence suggests that visual experience
during infancy plays a prominent role in shaping the face-
processing system in humans and is thus likely to underlie the
boundary shift (Sangrigoli and De Schonen 2004; Sangrigoli et
al. 2005). One particularly pertinent recent study has examined
the role of visual experience with faces in infant macaque
monkeys: when newborn monkeys are raised without any
exposure to faces for a period of 6–24 mo and then exposed to
either human or monkey faces for a 1-mo period, they develop
a lasting preference for faces of this species (Sugita 2008).
These ﬁndings suggest that the boundary shift we observed
may thus reﬂect extended visual expertise for own-species
faces during infancy. Boundary shifts may serve as sensitive
indicators of the relative strength of encoding for two catego-
ries. These boundary shifts could be estimated using explicit or
implicit behavioral tasks but also by applying pattern classiﬁers
to neural data allowing the read out of experiences that are not
consciously accessible. This approach could be very useful for
studying concept learning in human infants or children, and,
indeed, there is already some interesting work in this direction
(Pollak and Kistler 2002).
Human subjects have been shown to perceive a number of
facial attributes categorically, including race (Levin and An-
gelone 2002; Lun Zhao 2008). Perception of own- and other-
race faces exhibits two interesting asymmetries that are com-
monly referred to as “other-race effects”: while categorization
is more efﬁcient for other-race faces, own-race faces are
identiﬁed and recognized more easily (Levin 1996 and 2000).
A recent study (Ge 2009) has demonstrated a correlation
between these two aspects of the other-race effect and argues
that they may both result from a common mechanism. We
suggest that the category boundary shift observed at the level
of IT cortex population activity may be this common mecha-
nism and can account for both types of other-race effects: the
shift of the category boundary from the center of the morph
space toward the own species leads to an increase in sensitivity
for faces closer to the own species. The capacity of neurons to
signal information about a set of stimuli depends on to what
extent ﬁring rates elicited by the stimulus feature of interest fall
within the dynamic range of the neuron. Neurons tuned to a
boundary at the center of the morph space are differentially
activated by stimuli close to the species boundary, and their
dynamic range is allocated far from the own-species face stimuli.
A boundary shift toward the own species results in the dynamic
range also shifting into the own species part of the species
continuum, making the neural dynamic range available for
signaling individual differences of own-species faces. This
enhancement in encoding resources for own-species faces
results in a greater capacity for individuation. Nevertheless,
this occurs at the expense of optimized encoding for category
membership. The opposite is true for the other-species cate-
gory, leading to a reduced capacity for individuation but easier
read out of category membership. Thus, a boundary shift in the
race continuum might be the underlying cause of both im-
proved individuation and compromised categorization perfor-
mance for own-race faces.
Our experimental design allows us to take advantage of the
face expertise that human and monkey observers have acquired
during their life. This permits us to investigate the effects of
visual learning on face representations, since monkeys and
humans have characteristic histories of viewing faces of each
species. The laboratory monkeys participating in our study
were raised in large monkey colonies containing dozens of
animals for the ﬁrst months after birth and in the laboratory are
housed in groups of typically four to six animals. They also
have, by comparison, limited contact with humans, such as
animal care staff and laboratory scientists. Thus, particularly
during early infancy, they are in contact almost exclusively
with members of their own species. Conversely, human sub-
jects have had almost exclusive visual contact with members of
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their own species for most of their life, yet are familiar with
monkeys from visits to zoos or television. Given these sub-
stantial differences in exposure and ethological relevance,
own- and other-species faces are thus good candidates for
revealing species differences in cortical categorical represen-
tations. In contrast to our ﬁndings for species, adult experience
of human subjects strongly affects their perception of faces of
unfamiliar race (Webster et al. 2004). There are two factors
that might account for this difference: 1) our monkey experts
continued to be exposed to many human faces in addition to the
monkey faces, whereas the subjects in the Webster et al. (2004)
study were exposed predominantly to other-race faces during
learning; and 2) visual features share more characteristics
among human faces of two different races compared with
human versus monkey faces. Both these effects may enable
stronger plasticity for other-race face learning compared with
other-species face learning, leading to a boundary shift for
other-race faces but not for other-species faces.
Our study demonstrates separable representations of own-
species faces from those of another primate species in the
monkey IT cortex. The monkey IT cortex contains many
neurons that respond selectively to faces (Desimone et al.
1984; Leopold et al. 2006; Perrett et al. 1982; Tsao et al. 2006).
These face cells are thought to underlie the capacity to recog-
nize faces and to decode from them a variety of signals about
identity, sex, gaze direction, or emotion. Previous work has
indicated that individual face cells often respond to both human
and monkey faces (Tsao et al. 2006), and multi-dimensional
scaling analyses have revealed separate response patterns cor-
responding to faces of different species (Kiani et al. 2007). Our
results agree with these studies in that differences in human
and monkey faces were not encoded in the magnitude of the
mean neural responses (Tsao et al. 2006) but instead in the
pattern of the combined population activity (Kiani et al. 2007).
Our results conﬁrm the existence of separable representations
and extend these ﬁndings by demonstrating a bias in favor of
the own species representation that is reﬂected in a boundary
shift between the representations of the monkey and human
face categories. In humans, we observed a boundary shift that
was similar in magnitude but opposite in direction. This sug-
gests that visual expertise in humans leads to changes in the
neural representation of natural categories. In addition, the
existence of a category boundary is indicative of categorical
perception of face species in humans, consistent with previous
results (Campbell et al. 1997). These ﬁndings are part of a large
body of studies documenting that humans perceive a variety of
face attributes, including sex, race, or emotions, categorically
(Calder 1996; Campbell et al. 1997; Etcoff and Magee 1992;
Harnad 1987). Categorical perception of faces occurs when the
visual system treats a continuous set of face stimuli, such as a
set of morphed stimuli that span the continuum between two
prototypes, as belonging to two discrete categories separated
by the category boundary. The hallmark of categorical percep-
tion is that pairs of faces in a continuum differing by a given
physical amount should be discriminated more accurately
when that difference straddles the category boundary (Harnad
1987).
Recent work on categorization conducted in parallel in
humans and monkeys has emphasized the commonalities in the
neural representations of natural categories across these two
primate species (Kriegeskorte et al. 2008). In particular, clas-
siﬁcation trees estimated from single neuron data in monkeys
and fMRI data in human subjects show similar branching
structure. Our results focus on a particular aspect of these data
and show that species-dependent differences do exist in the
category representation. This is not inconsistent with a com-
mon code for primate categorization. However, it suggests that
while common principles and learning mechanisms may be at
work in both species, particular species-speciﬁc experiences
with certain categories will be reﬂected in the structure of their
categorical representations. Indeed, both primate species share
similar experiences with many natural categories such as fruit
or body parts. Thus, our ﬁndings suggest while the neural code
for face representation is species speciﬁc, the representations
themselves are established by the same organizing principles.
In our neural recordings, monkeys performed a ﬁxation task
rather than a task that required them to actively sort stimuli into
categories. We used this approach because we wanted to obtain
information about how experiences with same and other spe-
cies faces during everyday experiences were reﬂected in their
neural representation. We thus use the well-established ap-
proach of Tanaka and colleagues, which has provided a wealth
of information about object representation (Kiani et al. 2005;
Kobatake and Tanaka 1994; Tanaka 2003). We speciﬁcally
wanted to avoid training monkeys on categorization tasks,
because this might lead to changes in the category boundary or
other aspects of the neural representation. Indeed, it has been
shown that categorization training can dramatically and rapidly
alter neural responses, particularly in the parietal cortex
(Freedman and Assad 2006) but also in other brain areas. Such
training would be likely to mask the effects of interest in the
present study. Tasks involving active sorting of stimuli into
categories (Freedman et al. 2001; Nieder et al. 2002) always
involve rewarding certain behavioral responses. In our case,
rewarding or omitting rewards to morphed faces would be
problematic during such a task, because monkeys will always
adapt their responses to maximize the reward. The behavioral
boundary may thus reﬂect the strategy used by the monkey
more than the internal representation of the stimuli. To avoid
this confound, we chose a preferential looking paradigm to
provide behavioral evidence for a shifted category boundary in
monkeys. We show that monkeys treated a 50/50 morph like a
human face and not like a monkey face, consistent with a
category boundary that is shifted toward the monkey side away
from the morph space center.
In our study, only few neurons grouped faces along the
human-monkey continuum into the two categories in a simple
step-like fashion. However, the population contained categor-
ical information about the species that the faces belonged to.
The signature of categorical perception was an enhancement in
the difference of neural responses to pairs of faces that strad-
dled the category boundary compared with face pairs that did
not. This enhancement could be observed both for the popu-
lation of face neurons and for the entire population of recorded
neurons analyzed using a pattern classiﬁer. An important
implication of our ﬁndings is that categories are represented in
the brain not just by step-like neurons but also by other neurons
that modulate their activity as a function of morph level
between the categories. Behavioral categorization has a step-
like function, since stimuli on one side of the category bound-
ary are classiﬁed as belonging to category A and those on the
other side already to category B. For this reason, neural
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investigations into categorization have initially focused on
neurons also showing such step-like behavior and thus directly
mirroring the behavioral ﬁndings (Akrami et al. 2009; Freed-
man et al. 2001 and 2003). Neurons showing other behaviors
(particularly behaviors that appeared hard to reconcile with
behavioral categorization functions, such as inverted U-shaped
tuning) received little attention. Our study emphasizes that
neurons with all types of tuning contribute to categorization,
not just step-like neurons. In addition, inverted U-shaped
neurons are particularly implicated in categorization, because
they exhibit maximum range of activity (and therefore selec-
tivity) in the center of the stimulus continuum between the
categories, where the categorical boundary is placed. Theories
of cognitive psychology posit that the enhancement of discrim-
inability at the category boundary is central to categorization
(Harnad 1987). Our ﬁndings suggest that this is also true for
the neural network underlying categorization in the primate
temporal lobe.
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